The Twilight of Network-Centric Warfare

Highly respected writer and industry analyst Loren B. Thompson has just penned an opinion piece on recent changes in the Pentagon related to how DoD does IT.  The piece, titled “The Twilight of Network-Centric Warfare” is worth a full read by anyone in the IT business, in or out of government.

Dr. Thompson argues that the recent directive by secretary of defense Gates spelling out his intention to reorganize and eliminate the senior staff overseeing department networks and information integration (ASD NII) and moves at the same time to eliminate J6′s marked the end of the network centric era.

The meat of Thompson’s article reads:

When a Defense Business Board task force recommended last month that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) eliminate its networking and information integration secretariat, it signaled just how far from grace the notion of network-centric warfare has fallen. The secretariat was established at the tail-end of the dot.com boom to coordinate the joint force’s migration from industrial-age warfare into the era of information warfare. Proponents of network-centric warfare believed new information technologies were so powerful that they could overthrow traditional warfighting concepts if backed up with appropriate military doctrine and organizations. OSD’s office of networks and information integration — NII for short — was supposed to shepherd this vision into reality by overseeing a raft of multi-billion-dollar investment projects.

A decade later, nobody talks about military transformation anymore, and joint initiatives begun under its banner such as the Transformational Communications Satellite and Future Combat System are fading memories. Service-level projects like the Navy’s Next-Generation Enterprise Network increasingly look like wasteful efforts to re-invent the wheel — efforts that are doomed to be canceled as Washington turns to deficit reduction and military budgets shrink. So what went wrong? How is it possible for every policymaker in the five-sided building to embrace a common vision of information-age warfare at the beginning of a decade, and for it all to be forgotten by decade’s end?

The first thing that went wrong was that threats evolved differently than military planners expected. The authors of network-centric warfare thought that the joint force was in the midst of a prolonged “strategic pause” when the decade began, after which some new peer or near-peer adversary would emerge. That pause ended unexpectedly on 9-11, and America suddenly found itself facing a very different kind of danger. Networks and information technology have certainly proven useful in dealing with elusive new adversaries, but so far they haven’t proven to be the winning weapon that visionaries expected. It turns out that all those networks the Pentagon was planning are just conduits, and that what matters more for victory is the accuracy and completeness of the information moving through the networks.

The second problem that proponents did not see coming was that the new technology itself might become a source of weakness. Planners implicitly assumed that if the Pentagon invested heavily enough in cutting-edge networks and information applications, it could leverage the warfighting potential of the new technology while staying comfortably ahead of other countries with similar ideas. Well, it hasn’t worked out that way. We now know that everybody from the Taliban to Mexican drug cartels can benefit from the reach and richness of wideband networks. Even worse, they can tap into our own networks, as China proves on a daily basis. So the military has had to launch a crash program to prevent its gee-whiz networks from being used against it (incidentally, the Navy is inexplicably trying to replace the one big network that so far has proven largely immune to hostile penetrations, in order to implement a more “advanced” architecture).

I think I should add some commentary from a CTO perspective.

- As far as I can tell, this reorganization is not because a concept fell from grace.  The reorganization seems to be designed to save money by reducing staff overhead.  Although I personally don’t agree that this is a smart move, the functions are being organized into other places (both at OSD and DISA) and there are high expectations that IT will continue to be enhanced and modernized in the department.

- Very few believed that new IT programs would give us an ability so powerful that IT would overthrow traditional militaries.  There has always been a “lunatic fringe” of folks who thought like that, but the mainstream always saw IT as a critical enabler. The folks I know who see the benefit of new operational constructs leveraging network-centric-warfare still know that real war is still a very bloody, boots-on-the-ground activity.

- Although the title “NII” was born out of a reorganziation.  Its functions existed before as ASD C3I.  Its functions will continue in the future in the new organization.  This is an important point.

- It is certainly true that network-centric concepts made significant contributions to success in conflict.  The functions of NII helped that occur.  Those functions will still enhance the use of IT in the department in the future, just in a different organization.  But it is true that threats evolved differently than military planners expected.  Can you tell me what is new about that?  We have to continue planning, of course, but should not be surprised when we are surprised (how is that for some deep national security guidance?)

- It is not accurate to say that proponents of net centric warfare did not see that IT itself could be a weakness.  This accusation is just unfounded.  But the fact is IT is changing the military and will continue to do so, even though it has weaknesses.

Those are just some thoughts.

By the way, I’m not sure I support this move, I worry that it will be harder to continue the efficient and effective continuous improvement of IT in the Services and Joint world because of this.  But as an outsider and a fan of big enterprise IT folks, I’ll be pulling for the folks who have the mission and I really hope this works out well.

About BobGourley

Bob Gourley is Crucial Point LLC’s founder and editor of CTOvision.com. Bob has received industry recognition including Infoworld top CTO award, AFCEA’s meritorious service award, and recognition as one of the top 100 “Tech Titans” in DC by Washingtonian magazine. He was named one of the “Top 25 Most Fascinating Communicators in Government IT.”

  • Dave McDonald

    Bob- I agree with your analysis.

    Dr. Thompson way overplays his analysis. He needs to apply some common sense.

    The problem with ASD/NII was one of leadership. I have long admired Mr. John Grimes, but he just didn't get it done. A succession of ASD/C3Is and ASD/NIIs were all given the charter to force consolidation, integration, jointness, interoperability – and not a single one of them figured out how to address the problem from a policy, programs, organizational charters and acquisition strategy perspective. Mr. Grimes started to figure it out (I think), just in time to retire.

    So sure… Go ahead and kill ASD/NII – it didn't get the job done. But hopefully SECDEF is being well-advised as to what organizational/charter construct will be necessary to aggressively drive the GIG 2.0/JIE vision. Part of this is dealing with the tyranny of Title 10 and the hegemony the Services have had over IT acquisition and governance.

    Bumper stickers like "net-centric war" and "cyber war" and the like have always created lofty and inflated expectations. They also tend to foster the "lunatic fringe" you describe — promising goofy things that just don't add up. The world continues into the digital age apace, and this process will slow down for no one — not even the DoD or the U.S. extended national security community. So I'm not sure where Dr. Thompson gets his premise that computers and networks are going to be any less important to our security future just because the SECDEF is moving some boxes around on a wire diagram and killing some ineffective staffs.

    Great post!

  • Joe Mazzafro

    As the DoD CIO, NII failed and that is why it going away not because netcentric warfare is yesterday's news. NII could not track DoD IT assets, let alone manage them or lead DoD to an enterprise IT state. The continued currency of Net-Centric Warfare is reflected by the establishment of cyber as warfare domain and the establishment of US CyberCom to operate and fight there. What is troubling is that the DoD CIO function is being shifted down echelon from OSD to DISA

    joemaz

  • Dan Morgan

    Wow, you're absolutely correct – Dr. Thompson is way off the reservation on this one. Ask the Navy how many different networks are on board a given ship. Ask them how many networks exist in the Continental United States – and how many they've decommissioned on the way to the current number. Aside from that, the unclassified business systems have nothing to do with Net-Centric Warfare!

    I've lived the Navy's Cyber-Asset Reduction & Security initiative, and I was part of the requirements team for NGEN. I can honestly say that the primary problem we have is that Net-Centricity has failed to divorce the infrastructure from the system. They're acquired as turnkey solutions, they're operated as turnkey solutions, and interoperability is an afterthought – a bolt-on.

    The reason that NII "failed" is because they couldn't enforce interoperability standards, not because Net-Centricity is a dying concept. Intellipedia is the perfect counterexample to Dr. Thompson's argument. The network *is* the platform. Always has been.

  • kristalsoldier

    Dr. Thompson's analysis is flawed. It is flawed because it is based on a faulty premise, namely that the "vision" of the original NCW theorists – Cebrowski, Gartska, Arquilla, Libicki – was flawed. Nothing is further from the truth. If you read the stuff that these theorists wrote, they were were prescient about the Age of the Wars of the Small and the Many – exactly the kind of wars that the U.S. (and others) are facing in the Af-Pak areas today.

    What Dr. Thompson is probably referring to is the technicist interpretation of NCW which, like all technical accounts of war, is indeed flawed, But to say that this is what the original NCW theorists were working on is patently incorrect, misleading and just goes to show how wrong Dr. Thompson is in his understanding and appreciation of what NCW was actually about. But then again, who knows what compulsions Dr. Thompson is under to have penned such a ridiculous article!

    Cheers!

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