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A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace

Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology. It is also an area of continuous conflict.

A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 by Jason Healey is a well researched, well history of how humanity is using cyberspace to seek to impose their will on others. It contains the lessons learned in previous episodes of our history.

This book is a first of its kind. It provides a comprehensive history of cyber conflict in a way that generates lessons learned from every major engagement. It identifies key issues for policy makers, and spells out clearly the difference between common myths and reality.

There is a great conflict underway right now. We want to be on the winning side. That will only be possible if our populace and policy makers are well educated on what we are up against. That is possible now, thanks to Healey.

For more see: A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012

If you are a policy-maker over a large organization or responsible for crafting law/regulations you need this book to help shape your actions. If you are a citizen you need this book to help shape your agenda for action and what policies you will support. And if you are home user or business user you can use this book to help strengthen your defenses.

More Reading:

For more on these topics see the CTOvision Guide to National Security Technology and

 

The U.S.’s Defensive Challenge in Cyberspace

Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology. In cyberspace it is generally thought that offense has the advantage over defense because defenders must be perfect and attackers only have to be successful once. It is also commonly thought that the U.S. has the biggest space to defend because of its heavy reliance on networks for everyday life and military operations. So how can the U.S. meet such a defensive challenge and why haven’t we seen more “real” cyberattacks that cause physical destruction or the loss/changing of data (rather than DDOS or website defacing)?

The equation gets a little more complex the more I think about it. My first idea is that such attacks might have happened or are happening but companies and governments are not publically admitting to being victims for a variety of understandable reasons. Beyond that three key elements have to coalesce for an attack to occur. Attackers need motivation, whether that be financial, political-social, or military in nature. They also need the opportunity and means to conduct the attack. Each of these are readily available online for DDOS style attacks (it doesn’t cost much to rent a Botnet) or hacking websites, but not as readily available for pathways into and exploits for SCADA systems for example. Even with the right tools and motivation, an attacker must pick and choose the right time to attack to maximize the damage or impact. The journey to launching a potential attack doesn’t end there.

The USG and some corporations have gotten increasingly better at attribution, and at least the government has begun to lay out the groundwork for what types of attacks it will and won’t tolerate/respond aggressively to. While cyber deterrence is a hotly debated issue, some level or degree (even if minute) of deterrence may be happening at this very moment. Add this deterrence to the above checklist of why and how an actor conducts an attack and you’ve successfully narrowed the pool of potential attackers from every script kiddie with an internet connection down to a set of skilled and motivated hackers who are not deterred by potential retaliations and are actively going after the U.S.

This is how we must view our defensive challenge.

I’d argue we can meet this particular challenge. The obvious first step is to increase our defenses. It is a costly but necessary step for the U.S. government and every private corporation. The private sector offers the government some of the best defensive products and intelligence services to meet this goal. But, as a whole, the private sector also often fails to use these commercially available computer defense products to protect their own networks. A corollary to that is conducting active defense and pushing out the defensive perimeter as far as possible. No matter how you define active defense, it must be an intelligence driven process so that some attacks never even get launched/reach their target.

What other steps do you think the USG or corporations should take to meet the defensive challenge we face in cyberspace?

More Reading:

For more on these topics see the CTOvision Guide to National Security Technology and

Is the United States Militarizing Cyberspace?

Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology. Though cybersecurity has been a concern for decades, we have seen an uptick of concern during the last four years. The Obama administration has made the issue a priority. Early in his term, the President gave a speech on the subject and the next month the Secretary of Defense announced the creation of the military’s U.S. Cyber Command, as yet the most significant policy response to the cybersecurity challenges facing the nation. The backdrop to all of this was an increasing discussion of the definition and possibility of “cyberwar” and “cyberwarfare.” In this context, a number of critical observers, including myself, raised concerns about the possible militarization of cyberspace. Others claimed that fears of militarization were unfounded. As we approach either the end of Obama’s first term or the end of his presidency, it is worth revisiting the issue of militarization. Has the United States militarized cyberspace?

At its most basic level, militarizing cyberspace would involve “giv[ing] a military character to” it, “equip[ping][it] with military forces and defenses” and/or “adapt[ing][it] for military use.” Determining the degree of militarization would also hinge upon determining the degree to which the military as an institution is the primary actor in responding to cybersecurity challenges. During the last four years, we have seen all of these occur alongside a growing role for the military in responding to the nation’s cybersecurity challenges. This is despite assurances that the United States was not militarizing cyberspace.

On a number of occassions, civilian and military leaders have assured us that the United States was not militarzing cyberspace and that the military was not taking the lead in responding to cybersecurity challenges. This has at times caused controversy. In the spring of 2010, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) called for a greater role for the Department of Defense in national cybersecurity, a call that the head of USCYBERCOM, Gen. Keith Alexander, seemed to resist.

Several months later, in summer 2010, concerns about possible militarization were raised again when the Wall Street Journal reported on a National Security Agency (NSA) program called “Perfect Citizen.” The program would allegedly involve NSA surveillance meant to detect cyber attacks against private companies and civilian critical infrastructures. Reports that a contractor involved with the program had called it “Big Brother” only added to concerns. In response, the NSA assured us that “Perfect Citizen” was only a research and development project and that the military was not taking over civilian cyber security.

These assurances did not allay concerns about militarization. A year later, in his July 2011 speech introducing the first Department Of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III felt the need to address “concerns that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized.” He told his audience, “We have designed our DoD Cyber Strategy to address this concern.” This involved an “emphasis on cyber defenses”–as opposed to offense or retaliation–that was meant to illustrate DoD’s comittment “to protecting the peaceful use of cyberspace. […] Indeed, establishing robust cyber defenses no more militarizes cyberspace than having a navy militarizes the ocean.”

The first problem with Lynn’s assurances, however, was that this very same strategy and his speech to introduce it provided one more piece of the militarization puzzle. In his speech, he noted that the new DoD strategy would treat “cyberspace as an operational domain, like land, air, sea, and space. Treating cyberspace as a domain means that the military needs to operate and defend its networks, and to organize, train, and equip our forces to perform cyber missions”–i.e. “giv[ing] a military character to” it, “equip[ping][it] with military forces and defenses” and “adapt[ing][it] for military use.” While assuring listeners that DoD did not intend to militarize cyberspace, he all but used the dictionary definition of “militarize” in describing the intent of the new strategy.

The second problem was that the speech and strategy did not address the other aspects of cyberspace militarization that we knew had already taken place by July 2011. The creation of a dedicated military command certainly constitutes “equip[ping][it] with military forces and defenses.” We also already knew that these military cyber forces would have an offensive as well as defensive mission–i.e. that they were “adapt[ing][cyberspace] for military use.” But as I noted at the time, neither the DoD strategy nor Lynn’s speech addressed the issue of how our military cyber forces would be used offensively, making the strategy both disingenuous as a PR document and incomplete as a strategy document.

Almost one year later still, in June 2012, we learned that even as Lynn and others assured us that the DoD strategy was primarily defensive, the United States had been conducting covert, offensive cyber attacks against Iran. Cyberspace, which our leaders had characterized as a military domain, had been successfully adapted for military use by our dedicated cyber forces. Again, this is the definition of militarization.

But what of the question regarding the military’s role in national cybersecurity? Senator McCain has not been alone in calling for a greater military role. For example, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said that the military should be in charge of cybersecurity and should have more of an offensive orientation.

And there are indicators that the military’s role is, in fact, increasing. In August 2012, the Washington Post reported:

The Pentagon has proposed that military cyber-specialists be given permission to take action outside its computer networks to defend critical U.S. computer systems — a move that officials say would set a significant precedent.

[…]

The proposed rules would open the door for U.S. defense officials to act outside the confines of military-related computer networks to try to combat cyberattacks on private computers, including those in foreign countries.

What’s more, the Washington Post report indicates that this proposed expansion in the role of military cyber forces in the domestic space “is significantly narrower than what the military originally sought.”

Finally, James Lewis, a leading cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has recently said that an October 2012 speech on cybersecurity by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta indicates that the Department of Defense is effectively taking over U.S. cyber security.

If the United States has not yet fully militarized cyberspace, it has taken significant steps in that direction. Official policy has characterized it as an operational military domain, has equipped it with military forces, and has adapted it for military use. We hear powerful voices calling for an expanded military role in civilian cybersecurity and see strong indicators that, at minimum, the military will indeed play an increasingly important role, perhaps even the central role in our nation’s cybersecurity.

More Reading:

For more on these topics see the CTOvision Guide to National Security Technology and

The Strongest Tribe: Issues of power in cyberspace

Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology. Mikko Hypponen has a mea culpa about Flame that is worth reading. The F-Secure chief believes that antivirus companies, including his own, failed to detect Flame and that this failure has broader implications:

The truth is, consumer-grade antivirus products can’t protect against targeted malware created by well-resourced nation-states with bulging budgets. They can protect you against run-of-the-mill malware: banking trojans, keystroke loggers, and e-mail worms. But targeted attacks like these go to great lengths to avoid antivirus products on purpose. And the zero-day exploits used in these attacks are unknown to antivirus companies by definition. As far as we can tell, before releasing their malicious codes to attack victims, the attackers tested them against all of the relevant antivirus products on the market to make sure that the malware wouldn’t be detected. They have unlimited time to perfect their attacks. It’s not a fair war between the attackers and the defenders when the attackers have access to our weapons.

In short: all of the AV gear in the world is not going to protect you when a well-resourced state intelligence service is trying to execute a zero-day exploit against your systems, just like even the most expensive private security would not save your life if the Navy SEALs came for you like they did for Bin Laden. This is significant, not only for network defense, but also for the way we think about power and security online. Simply put: states are dominant in cyberspace. States are the primary threats precisely because of their greater resources and ability to generate political and military outcomes. State power, is of course, not total in cyberspace, just as there are many offline disruptions of power and sovereignty that still nonetheless leave states as the primary actors within the international system.

Richard Stiennon reinforces this message with his latest Forbes blog on the consequences of Stuxnet. Operation Olympic Games, Stiennon argues, risks creating a tension between the worldwide IT industry, which focuses on providing cyber defenses to all, and the US government, which seeks to develop offensive cyber capabilities for covert action and military operations. Stiennon predicts that the US government, should it desire, may clamp down on AV vendors in order to deprive likely targets of defensive capabilities. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have demanded backdoors in everything from encryption to social network profiles. Finally, the SOPA/PIPA mess also illustrates the degree to which governments have far-reaching powers to regulate cyberspace. Cyberspace is often analogized to the Wild West, but one forgets that in the real West the US government eventually developed formidable political, military, and law enforcement coercive powers to enforce its writ.

While this might seem like common sense, it runs against one of the Web’s strongest prevailing mythos. In 1996, John Perry Barlow declared that cyberspace itself was independent and could never be tamed by government:

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.

Now, some caveats: Barlow did not mean that cyberspace was literally independent. But the basic utopian spirit of his declaration spread throughout the technorati. Glib slogans like “Information wants to be free” and “the Internet routes around censorship” melded with a myth of “Twitter Revolutions” during the 2009 Iranian election crisis and the Arab spring. The idea that there is something sacred in information freedom is the closest thing that can be called a motivating principle for Anonymous. But Barlow’s successors confused an admirable normative idea of how information power should be–the Internet should not be hobbled by government regulation–into an assessment of the actual relationship between state and non-state entities in the information sphere. In other words, Barlow’s declaration of independence of cyberspace is looking more and more like the cyber equivalent of Paris Commune today. Beautiful and admirable, for sure. But also incredibly fragile.

Does this mean that government is in firm control of cyberspace or should exercise complete control? No to both questions. As Tim Stevens observed, cyberspace provides opportunities for infringement of sovereignty every nanosecond. Anonymous’ success at the expense of the feds and the constant foreign criminal and intelligence service intrusion in both government and corporate systems. And the prosperity cyberspace has delivered is imperiled, or at least heavily complicated, by a tight government rein and the second and third-order effects of offensive cyberwarfare efforts. But as a statement of day-to-day truth, Uncle Sam is the “strongest tribe” in the Internet’s Wild West where it counts.

More Reading:

For more on these topics see the CTOvision Guide to National Security Technology and

Review: Cyberspace and the State

Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology. Cyberspace is an evolving medium, and the best strategic thinking about cyber dimensions of commerce, security, politics, and warfare is likely yet to come. I was happy, however, to read David Betz and Tim Stevens’ recent International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) monograph Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-Power. It is a valuable addition to the growing library on cyber strategy, and a valuable read not only for students of strategy and policy but also for network defenders and industry executives looking for a broader contextualization of present day cyber challenges.

First, let’s cross off what Cyberspace and the State is not. Betz and Stevens have not written a “gee-whiz” book arguing that everything is new. They are aware of the prehistory of hacking, and note such seminal events in the hacker subculture ranging from MIT’s Tech Model Railway Club to the worm assault on NASA computers in 1989. This is also not a book that propagates “cyber-doom” scenarios or seeks to convince you that the Chinese and Russians can control everything from SCADA systems to nuclear launch networks. The cyber-world is scary enough without embellishment, and Betz and Stevens do not indulge in the dark side. Lastly, Cyberspace and the State is also not a cyber-utopian book–it is broadly aware that (contra Barlow) cyberspace is not independent. Like Gregory Rattray, Betz and Stevens also have a strong grasp of political-military history and also deploy their extensive knowledge of international relations to the task.

It is difficult to summarize the book–for a short monograph it is literally packed with ideas. Betz and Stevens explore the many dimensions of national cyber-power, the definition of cyberspace itself and what it constitutes, and make a principled case for a more relaxed approach to Internet governance. For the state to thrive, Betz and Stevens argue, it will have to get used to the idea of accepting that an economically prosperous cyberspace will necessarily create areas in which pure sovereignty will have to be delegated or at least relaxed. Betz and Stevens note that Western states, particularly European states seeking to exercise strict controls over political discourse in cyberspace, mirror the practices of more authoritarian countries like Russia and China.

Perhaps one of the most useful aspects of Betz and Stevens’ work is that it rigorously adheres to a limited and useful typology of information warfare. Taking the early 1990s writings of figures like John Arquilla, Dorothy Denning, and Martin Libicki as their guidepost, Betz and Stevens look at cyberwar and IW as merely the use of information to either heighten one’s own advantage or degrade the information resources possessed by the opposing side. IW here is an umbrella term referring to a host of activities governing the flow of information, cyberwar being only one. Betz and Stevens are also rigorous in dismissing attempts to dub everything under the sun “cyberwar,” but also are not blind to the myriad ways in which cyber power can be exercised. Sometimes, critiques of cyberwar do not make sufficient latitude for the fact that there are other uses of cyberspace beyond kinetic destruction or terrorism that can enhance the power (or bottom line) of state and non-state actors.

Grab a copy of Cyberspace and the State to understand not only the past and present of cyberpower, but also where it may be going in the future. There have been very little useful new ways of thinking about the cyber environment over the last 15 years, but Betz and Stevens have written a classic that is likely to stand the test of time.

The Future of Cyberspace Security: The Law of The Rodeo

This is an update of my now annual assessment of the future of technology associated with good and evil in cyberspace which was first posted here.

Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology.

Predictions of the future of technology are increasingly starting to sound like science fiction, with powerful computing grids giving incredible computational power to users and with autonomous robots becoming closer and closer to being in our daily lives vice just in computer science departments. Infotech, nanotech and biotech are fueling each other and each of those three dominate fields are generating more and more benefits that impact the other, propelling us even faster into a new world.   Depending on your point of view the increasing pace of science and technology can be good or bad.  As for me, I’m an optimist, and I know we humans will find a way to ensure technology serves our best interests.

But a sad fact of the human condition is that bad people will likely be with us long into the future.  And sometimes good people can be tempted to do bad things, so we really need to engineer solutions that
keep the bad guys from benefiting from technology and keep those who can sometimes be tempted from giving in to their darker side.

So is is possible to engineer perfectly secure systems?  Consider the law of the rodeo:  “There’s not a horse that’s never been rode, and not a rider that’s never been throwed.”  I like the analogy since it reminds us that all computer evil can be mitigated.  But it always fights back.  Good and evil will continue a fast paced rodeo dance long into the future.

To engineer secure systems for the future we need to continually assess where we are and what the near term future holds for our technologies.  Here is a couple short predictions that could be useful
in this discussion.

  • Remote power is here today and will soon be widely distributed.  This will allow small power consumption devices (like keyboards, mice, bluetooth headsets, hearing aides, small sensors) to be provided power by RF energy.

– Power generation from motion is almost ready for prime time.  This will allow devices to gain energy from vibrations, like the vibrations in a bridge when a car passes over it, or the vibrations in a wall of a
building when the wind blows past it, or the vibrations caused by a person’s movement through the day.

– Communication capability (bandwidth) between fixed facilities will increase 1000 fold over the next five years. Cellular systems are on a dramatic improvement slope.  My view: AT&T seems to lead in speed this year.  Verizon will probably lead next year.

– More users will be on the net.  There are about 1.3Billion PC’s connected to the Internet today.  There are about 3.3Billion active cell phone subscriber accounts today.  Those numbers will grow.

– Storage, especially flash storage technologies, is decreasing in price so much we can afford to store data anywhere on almost anything.

– Chips are being designed in ways that actually beat the old Moore’s Law projections.  This is being done by placing many cores on one chip.  Very high data rate capabilities are being connected directly to the cores on these chips.

– RFID is becoming so widespread we can place devices on everything that allows devices to report back what they are and what they are for and where they have been.

– All this capabilities are being networked together, including increasingly direct device to device connections via capabilities provided by enhanced protocols (especially IPv6).

– Consumer devices, especially consumer communication devices, are becoming increasingly capable.  What used to be called a cell phone is now a phone/video recorder/video editor/entertainment/mobile office device with location aware data (GPS).

– Web2.0 and Social networking sites/tools such as Facebook will expand till one day 100% of the population will have active, up to date, authoratative online profiles.

– Cloud computing capabilities are not only being delivered to companies, but to end users.  Google leads the pack in this space, but Microsoft and Adobe are up and comers.

There are many other elements of the future relevant to security discussions, but the projections above lead to some interesting conclusions on their own.   So lets think through some of the impacts
of the above.

– Bad actors who want to exploit systems will increasingly not have to worry about them being powered off.  They will be on all the time.

– Bad actors will increasinly be able to expoit social systems to gather data pre-attack.  However, the powerful trust models of social networks may offer a counter to some of these attacks.

– Many paths into devices will be available for unauthorized users to exploit.   And if they are compromised by people or code that intend on generating denial of service attacks, huge amounts of bandwidth will exist for them to attack from.

– When a bad actor gets through defenses into data stores, they will likely find a wide range of data to exploit, since it is becoming so easy and low cost for us to store everything.

– Having things networked together means it can be easier to penetrate a target by finding one weak link that is connected to the infrastructure.

– Areas of people’s lives they once thought private, especially their cell phones and the data on their cell phones, are increasingly becoming attractive targets to hackers.

What is needed in an environment like this?  I can’t pretend to know all the solutions but here are a few points I support:

– Enhanced firewalls and intrusion detection devices.

– Better configuration control, for all devices.  When a device is out of configuration is must be brought back into compliance immediately.

– Better laws and treaties concerning cyberspace. Deterrence policies by governments.

– More attention to standards and to industry organizations (including supply chain quality  organizations) is a must.

– Better training and education for all (I mean ALL) humans connected to the grid.

– Better, continuous upgraded anti-virus solutions.

– Automated response to attacks.

– Enhanced, easier to use encryption.

– Enhanced, more secure identity and authorization technologies.

More Reading:

For more on these topics see the CTOvision Guide to National Security Technology and

An Enterprise CTO’s View of Cyberspace: Cyberspace is our Interconnected IT

The Definition of Cyberspace:

Cyberspace is our Interconnected IT

I heard yet another definition of cyberspace today.  I won’t repeat it here, I’ll just say it was an academic’s definition and it was somewhat useful to the particular conversation we were having.  But it pointed to an enduring problem for those who try to study these concepts.  If everyone everywhere can create their own definition of cyberspace, then how can we study this field?
At the risk of clouding things even further, I’ll propose a solution.

The term cyberspace is primarily used in two ways:

1) As a metaphor and

2) As a description of the modern IT environment.

Depending on which of those two usages is required, there are two easy definitions.  They follow:

When used as a metaphor, the term cyberspace must convey the full complexity and elegance of a new environment that is man made but seems alive. When a definition is required for this usage, there is none better than that written by the man who coined the term. William Gibson wrote about it in 1984 in his book Neuromancer. He defined cyberspace as “A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation… A graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity.”  For me that terms puts you in the frame of mind to creatively explore the realm of the possible and is still very much of use.

When the term is used in the context of real world actions and infrastructure, we can now use a very simple definition.  Cyberspace = The Information Technology in operation today (including hardware, software and data).

Said an even shorter/simpler way: Cyberspace is our interconnected information technology.

Is there any need for any other definition of the term “cyberspace”?

Cyberspace Is Our Interconnected Information Technology

For more on these topics see the CTOvision Guide to National Security Technology and

Good and Evil in the Future of Cyberspace

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